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Abstract
X–secure and T–private information retrieval (XSTPIR) is a form of private information
retrieval where data security is guaranteed against collusion among up to X servers and the
user’s privacy is guaranteed against collusion among up to T servers. The capacity of XSTPIR
is characterized for arbitrary number of servers N , and arbitrary security and privacy thresh-
olds X and T , in the limit as the number of messages K → ∞. Capacity is also characterized
for any number of messages if either N = 3, X = T = 1 or if N ≤ X + T . Insights are drawn
from these results, about aligning versus decoding noise, dependence of PIR rate on field size,
and robustness to symmetric security constraints. In particular, the idea of cross subspace
alignment, i.e., introducing a subspace dependence between Reed-Solomon code parameters,
emerges as the optimal way to align undesired terms while keeping desired terms resolvable.
1 Introduction
Motivated by the importance of security and privacy in the era of big data and distributed storage,
in this work we explore the information theoretic capacity of private information retrieval (PIR)
in a secure distributed storage system. Specifically, our focus is on the X-secure and T -private
information retrieval problem (XSTPIR). A PIR scheme is said to be T -private if it allows a user
to retrieve a desired message from a database of K messages stored at N distributed servers,
without revealing any information about the identity of the desired message to any group of up to
T colluding servers. Similarly, a distributed storage scheme is said to be X-secure1 if it guarantees
that any group of up to X colluding servers learn nothing about the stored data. The T and
X parameters may be chosen arbitrarily depending on the relative importance of security and
privacy for any given application.
The rate of a PIR scheme is the ratio of the number of bits retrieved by the user to the total
number of bits downloaded from all servers. The supremum of achievable rates is called the
capacity of PIR. The capacity of the basic PIR setting was found in [1] to be
CPIR(N,K) = (1 + 1/N + 1/N
2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1)−1. (1)
1In other words, everything that is stored at any X servers must be independent of the K messages. Besides X-
security, no other constraints are imposed on the storage. The storage and the PIR scheme are jointly optimized to
maximize the capacity of XSTPIR.
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The result was generalized subsequently in [2] to the T -PIR setting, as
CTPIR(N,K, T ) =
{ (
1 + T/N + T 2/N2 + · · ·+ TK−1/NK−1)−1 , T < N
1/K, T ≥ N. (2)
Further generalizations of T -privacy, e.g., when privacy is required only against certain specified
collusion patterns [3, 4] have also been explored. In particular, capacity is known for disjoint
colluding sets [4].
The rapidly growing body of literature in this area has produced capacity results for PIR under
a rich variety of constraints [5–20]. However, the capacity for the natural setting of secure storage
remains unknown, and relatively unexplored. While a number of efforts are motivated by security
concerns, such efforts have focused largely on other models, e.g., wiretap models where data
security is desired against eavesdroppers listening to the communication between the user and
the servers [21, 22], Byzantine models where the servers may respond incorrectly by introducing
erasures or errors in their response to the user’s queries [23–27], and so called symmetric security
models [28–30] that allow the user to learn nothing about the data besides his desired message. An
exception in this regard is the recent work in [31] where PIR with distributed storage is explored
and the asymptotic (large K) capacity for the X = T = 1 setting is bounded as(
1− 1√
N
)2
≤ lim
K→∞
CXSTPIR(N,K,X = 1, T = 1) ≤
(
1− 1
N
)
. (3)
As the main result of our work, we close this gap and characterize the asymptotic capacity of
XSTPIR for all N,X, T as follows.
lim
K→∞
CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ) =
{
1− (X+TN ) , N > X + T
0, N ≤ X + T. (4)
The asymptotic capacity characterization leads us to supplementary results which include a gen-
eral upper bound on the capacity of XSTPIR, the exact capacity characterization for any number of
messages K if N ≤ X + T , and the exact capacity characterization for any K if X = T = 1, N = 3.
The results also lead us to interesting observations about aligning versus decoding noise, depen-
dence of PIR rate on field size, robustness to symmetric security constraints, and a particularly
useful idea called cross subspace alignment. When privately retrieving multiple symbols from
a desired message in a secure distributed storage system, the structure (say, 1, β, β2, · · · , for one
symbol and 1, γ, γ2, · · · for another, as in Reed-Solomon (RS) codes) of storage and queries for
each symbol determines the number of dimensions occupied by interference and the resolvability
of desired symbols. Choosing identical RS codes (β = γ) for each symbol of the same message
would cause desired signals to align among themselves, while making the RS codes insufficiently
dependent would cause interference to occupy too many dimensions. Cross subspace alignment
is achieved by drawing the code parameters as linear combinations from the same subspace (say,
β = 1 + α, γ = 2 + α), which turns out to be the optimal way to align interference while keep-
ing desired symbols resolvable. For a summary of results and a better explanation of the main
observations we refer the reader directly to Section 3.
Let us start by defining our notation.
Notation: Let [m : n] denote the set {m,m+1, . . . , n} for any two integersm,n such thatm ≤ n.
For sake of simplicity, let X[m:n] denote the set of random variables {Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xn}. For an
index set I = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, let XI denote the set {Xi1 , Xi2 , . . . , Xin}. For variables an, n ∈ [1 :
2
N ] and an arbitrary function f(·), we denote the N × 1 vector whose nth term is f(an), as
−−→
f(a).
Similarly,
−−→
g(b) denotes the vector (g(b1), · · · , g(bn))T for variables bn, n ∈ [1 : N ] and a function
g(·). For such N × 1 vectors −−→f(a) and −−→g(b), let −−→f(a) ◦ −−→g(b) denote their Hadamard product, i.e., the
N ×1 vector whose nth term is f(an)×g(bn). The notation X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y
are identically distributed. When a natural number, say ` ∈ N, is used to represent an element of
a finite field Fq, it denotes the sum of ` ones in Fq, i.e., ` ,
∑`
l=1 1, where the addition is over Fq.
2 XSTPIR: Problem Statement
Consider data that is stored at N distributed servers. The data consists of K independent mes-
sages, W1,W2, · · · ,WK , and each message is represented2 by L random symbols from the finite
field Fq.
H(W1) = H(W2) = · · · = H(WK) = L, (5)
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WK) = KL, (6)
in q-ary units. There are N servers. The information stored at the nth server is denoted by Sn, n ∈
[1 : N ]. An X-secure scheme, 0 ≤ X < N , guarantees that any X (or fewer) colluding servers
learn nothing about the data.
[X-Security] I(SX ;W1, . . . ,WK) = 0, ∀X ⊂ [1 : N ], |X | = X. (7)
Besides X-security, we place no other constraint3 on the amount of storage or the storage code
used at each server, all of which is jointly optimized to maximize the capacity of XSTPIR. To ensure
information retrieval is possible, note that the set of messages W1, · · · ,WK must be a function of
S[1:N ].
H(W1, · · · ,WK | S[1:N ]) = 0. (8)
The user generates a desired message index θ privately and uniformly from [1 : K]. In order to
retrieve Wθ privately, the user generates N queries, Q
[θ]
1 , Q
[θ]
2 , . . . , Q
[θ]
N . The query Q
[θ]
n is sent to the
nth server. The user has no prior knowledge of the information stored at the servers, i.e.,
I(S[1:N ];Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ) = 0. (9)
T -privacy, 1 ≤ T ≤ N , guarantees that any T (or fewer) colluding servers learn nothing about θ.
[T -Privacy] I(Q[θ]T , ST ; θ) = 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (10)
2As usual for an information theoretic formulation, the actual size of each message is allowed to approach infinity.
The parameters L and q partition the data into blocks and may be chosen freely by the coding scheme to match the
code dimensions. Since the coding scheme for a block can be repeated for each successive block of data with no impact
on rate, it suffices to consider one block of data subject to optimization over L and q.
3The amount of storage at each server is not constrained a priori, however, it is remarkable that none of the XSTPIR
schemes in this work end up storing more than KL symbols at each server. Thus the amount of storage used is not
worse than a data replication scheme in the absence of security constraints.
3
Upon receiving the query Q[θ]n , the nth server generates an answering string A
[θ]
n , as a function of
the query Q[θ]n and its stored information Sn.
H(A[θ]n |Q[θ]n , Sn) = 0. (11)
From all the answers the user must be able to recover the desired message Wθ,
[Correctness] H(Wθ|A[θ][1:N ], Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ) = 0. (12)
The rate of an XSTPIR scheme characterizes how many bits of desired message are retrieved per
downloaded bit, (equivalently, how many q-ary symbols of desired message are retrieved per
downloaded q-ary symbol),
R =
L
D
, (13)
whereD is the expected value (with respect to the random queries) of the number of q-ary symbols
downloaded by the user from all servers. The capacity of XSTPIR, denoted CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ), is
the supremum of achievable rates.
Finally, note that setting X = 0 and T = 1 reduces the XSTPIR problem to the basic PIR setting
where data storage is not secure and the user’s privacy is only guaranteed if no collusion takes
place among servers. SettingX = 0 for arbitrary T , reduces XSTPIR to the T -PIR problem. Setting
T = 0 for arbitrary X reduces XSTPIR to an X-secure storage scheme with no privacy constraint.
3 Capacity of XSTPIR: Results and Observations
The results of this work are presented in this section, followed by some observations.
3.1 Results
Our first result, presented in the following theorem, is an upper bound on the capacity of XSTPIR.
Theorem 1
CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ) ≤
(
N −X
N
)
CTPIR(N −X,K, T ). (14)
The proof of Theorem 1 appears in Section 4. The intuition behind Theorem 1 may be understood
through a thought experiment as follows. Without loss of generality, suppose the expected num-
ber of bits downloaded from each server is the same. Now, relax the constraints so that S[1:X],
i.e., the stored information at the first X servers is made available globally (to all servers and to
the user) for free, the messages W1,W2, · · · ,WK are made available to all servers, and the data-
security constraint is eliminated. None of this can hurt capacity because any XSTPIR scheme from
before can still be used with the relaxed constraints. So any upper bound on capacity of this re-
laxed setting is still an upper bound on the capacity of the original XSTPIR setting. The relaxed
setting is analogous to the T -PIR problem with K messages and N − X servers, for which we
already know the optimal download per server from the existing capacity results for T -PIR. Thus,
the statement of Theorem 1 follows. However, formalizing this intuition into a proof is not trivial
because of the correlated side-information generated at the user and servers in the process of re-
laxing the constraints. Indeed, the formal proof presented in Section 4 takes a less direct approach.
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It turns out the bound in Theorem 1 is quite powerful. In fact, we suspect that this bound might
be tight in general. An immediate observation is that if we set X = 0, i.e., remove the data storage
security constraint, then the bound is tight because it gives us the capacity of T -PIR. Similarly, if
we set T = 0, i.e., the privacy constraint is removed, then the bound is also tight, and the capacity
in the absence of privacy constraints is easily seen to be CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T = 0) = 1 − XN , which
is achievable by a simple secret-sharing scheme. We further prove the tightness of this bound for
the cases identified in our next set of results. The first setting identifies a somewhat degenerate
extreme where it is optimal to download everything.
Theorem 2 If N ≤ X + T , then4 for arbitraryK,
CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ) =
(
N −X
N
)
CTPIR(N −X,K, T ) (15)
=
N −X
NK
. (16)
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 5. Since the upper bound is already provided
by Theorem 1, only a proof of achievability is needed. Furthermore, since retrieving the desired
message in this setting amounts to downloading everything stored at all servers regardless of
which message is desired, the only thing required for the achievable scheme is a secure storage
scheme, which is readily achieved by including X uniformly random noise symbols for every
N −X symbols of each message.
Next, the main result of this paper is the asymptotic capacity characterization presented in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 As the number of messagesK →∞, for arbitrary N,X, T ,
lim
K→∞
CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ) = lim
K→∞
(
N −X
N
)
CTPIR(N −X,K, T ) (17)
=
{
1− (X+TN ) , N > X + T
0, N ≤ X + T. (18)
The proof of Theorem 3 appears in Section 6. Theorem 3 is significant for two reasons. First,
asymptotic capacity results are particularly relevant for PIR problems because the capacity ap-
proaches its asymptotic value extremely quickly — the gap is negligible even for moderate values
of K, and K is typically a large value. Second, the asymptotic capacity result showcases a new
idea, cross subspace alignment, that is interesting by itself.
Insights from the asymptotically optimal scheme allow us to settle the exact capacity of XSTPIR
with X = T = 1, N = 3 and arbitrary K.
Theorem 4 If the number of servers, N = 3, and X = T = 1, then for arbitrary number of messages,K,
CXSTPIR(N = 3,K,X = 1, T = 1) =
(
N −X
N
)
CTPIR(N −X,K, T ) (19)
=
2
3
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
22
+ · · ·+ 1
2K−1
)−1
. (20)
4Note that N > X by definition.
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Theorem 4 is proved in Section 7. The capacity achieving scheme introduces a new insight. For
almost all PIR settings studied so far, asymptotic capacity achieving schemes have been found that
send a uniformly random query vector to each server and download a product of the query vector
and information stored at the server. Suppose the query vector is uniform over FMq . Then with
probability 1/qM the query vector is all zero, and the scheme requests nothing from the server.
Typically M depends on the number of messages K. As K approaches infinity the probability of
requesting nothing approaches zero, so this does not help in the asymptotic sense. However, if
the same scheme is used for finite K, then M is also finite, 1/qM > 0, and the average download is
reduced by the factor (1−1/qM ), which improves the achieved rate of the scheme. It is remarkable
that the rate achieved in this way depends on the field size. This idea is essential to the capacity
achieving scheme for Theorem 4.
Next we present some observations that place our results in perspective.
3.2 Observations
3.2.1 Alignment of Noise and Interference
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Figure 1: Suboptimality of the rate achieved by the X = 1 secure MDS-PIR alternative that allows the user to
decode noise relative to the rate achieved with the asymptotically optimal XSTPIR scheme where the noise is aligned
with other interference.
Consider the simplest non-trivial setting for XSTPIR, where X = 1, T = 1, and the number
of servers, N ≥ 3. A natural idea for providing X = 1 secure storage is to include 1 indepen-
dent uniformly random noise symbol along with the L symbols of each message, creating a new
message with M = L + 1 symbols. This new message is stored across N servers according to
an (N,M) MDS code, essentially storing a linear combination of the M message symbols at each
server, where the coefficients for the noise symbol at each server must be non-zero. Capacity is
known for PIR with coded storage (MDS-PIR [5]), and one might wonder if such an MDS-PIR
scheme might suffice to achieve capacity with secure storage. It is not difficult to see that the best
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rate achievable with such an MDS-PIR scheme is
RMDS-PIR =
M − 1
M
(
1 +
(
M
N
)
+ · · ·+
(
M
N
)K−1)−1
. (21)
The M−1M penalty appears because one of the M symbols of the decoded message is the noise sym-
bol. As K → ∞, the rate approaches RMDS-PIR,∞ = M−1M
(
1− (MN )). This expression takes its
maximum value when M =
√
N , so it can be bounded as,
RMDS-PIR,∞ ≤
√
N − 1√
N
(
1−
(√
N
N
))
=
(
1− 1√
N
)2
. (22)
Note that this expression matches the achievable rate bound of [31]. However, it is strictly smaller
than, 1− 2/N , the asymptotic capacity of XSTPIR for this setting. Evidently, the natural MDS-PIR
solution, and the secret sharing based scheme of [31], are asymptotically suboptimal. In fact, the
MDS-PIR solution falls short of the asymptotic (K →∞) capacity of XSTPIR, even if the MDS-PIR
scheme is only required to deal with K = 2 messages. Denoting the corresponding rate of the
MDS-PIR scheme as RMDS-PIR,2, we have,
RMDS-PIR,2 ≤
√
N + 1√
N + 1 + 1
(
1 +
(√
N + 1 + 1
N
))−1
≤ 1− 2
N
. (23)
Figure 1 shows that the gap between the X = 1 secure MDS-PIR alternative and the XSTPIR
scheme is significant. Intuitively, the reason for this gap is the following. The secure MDS-PIR
alternative allows the user to decode the artificial noise symbol which is added to the message
to guarantee security. However, in the XSTPIR scheme, the user is able to decode only the de-
sired message, and not the noise protecting it. In fact this noise is aligned with other interfering
symbols, e.g., the noise terms protecting other message symbols, thus creating a more efficient
solution. Incidentally, the alignment of noise provides another unexpected benefit, in some cases
it automatically makes the scheme symmetrically secure, as explained next.
3.2.2 Symmetric Security: Capacity of Sym-XSPIR
Let us fix T = 1, thereby relaxing the T -privacy constraint to its minimum value for PIR. Now,
suppose in addition to X-secure storage, we also include the so called ‘symmetric’ security con-
straint, that the user should learn nothing about the data besides his desired message, i.e.,
[Sym-Security] I(W[1:K];A
[θ]
[1:N ] | Q
[θ]
[1:N ],Wθ, θ) = 0. (24)
Capacity of the basic (X = 0, T = 1,K > 1) Sym-PIR setting was shown in [28] to be
CSym-PIR(K,N) = 1− 1
N
. (25)
Note that there is a loss of capacity due to the additional symmetric security constraint. Further-
more, the capacity without the symmetric security constraint depends on the number of messages
K while the capacity with the symmetric security constraint does not.
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XSTPIR with the symmetric security constraint and with T = 1, in short the Sym-XSPIR setting
(note that we drop the T because T = 1 is the degenerate case for T -privacy), reveals a surprising
aspect of our XSTPIR schemes, that imposing the symmetric security constraint does not affect5
our capacity results for T = 1. This is made explicit in the following corollaries for Sym-XSPIR,
that match the corresponding theorems for XSTPIR.
Corollary 1
CSym-XSPIR(N,K,X) ≤
(
N −X
N
)
CPIR(N −X,K). (26)
Corollary 2 If N = X + 1, then6 for arbitraryK,
CSym-XSPIR(N,K,X) =
(
N −X
N
)
CPIR(N −X,K) (27)
=
1
NK
. (28)
Corollary 3 As the number of messagesK →∞, for arbitrary N,X ,
lim
K→∞
CSym-XSPIR(N,K,X) = lim
K→∞
(
N −X
N
)
CPIR(N −X,K) (29)
=
{
1− (X+1N ) , N > X + 1
0, N ≤ X + 1. (30)
Corollary 4 If the number of servers, N = 3, and X = 1, then for arbitrary number of messages,K,
CSym-XSPIR(N = 3,K,X = 1) =
(
N −X
N
)
CPIR(N −X,K) (31)
=
2
3
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
22
+ · · ·+ 1
2K−1
)−1
. (32)
The proofs of all 4 corollaries appear in Appendix B. Surprisingly, note that there is no loss of
capacity in each case due to the additional symmetric security constraint. Also note that according
to Corollary 4, unlike Sym-PIR, the capacity of Sym-XSPIR depends on the number of messages
K for all K > 1.
3.2.3 Cross Subspace Alignment
Conceptually, the most intriguing aspect of the asymptotically optimal XSTPIR scheme is the ex-
tent to which it is able to align interference. Interference alignment is central to PIR [1, 32], and
nearly all existing PIR constructions use some form of interference alignment. The strength of
XSTPIR lies in the novel idea of cross subspace alignment, that we explain intuitively in this sec-
tion through an example. Consider the setting of X = 2 secure and T = 1 PIR with N = 5 servers.
Let w1 be a symbol from a desired message W . For simplicity (and because identical alignments
5For T > 1 our XSTPIR schemes are not symmetrically secure.
6Note that since X < N by definition, and T = 1 for XSPIR, the condition N ≤ X + T is equivalent to N = X + 1.
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are applied to all messages), it suffices to focus on only this message for the purpose of this expla-
nation. In order to guarantee X = 2 security, w1 is mixed with 2 random noise symbols z11, z12,
according to the following RS Code, so that the nth row is stored at the nth server, n ∈ [1 : 5].

1
1
1
1
1
w1 +

β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
 z11 +

β21
β22
β23
β24
β25
 z12
, −→1 w1 +−→β z11 +
−→
β2z12.
To ensure privacy, the query symbol qθ (qθ = 1, i.e., this message is desired) is similarly mixed
with a noise symbol z′1.
−→
1 qθ +
−→
β z′1 =
−→
1 +
−→
β z′1
and the nth row of this query vector is sent to the nth server. Each server returns the product of
the noisy query symbol and the noisy stored symbol, so that the user receives the 5 answers.(−→
1 w1 +
−→
β z11 +
−→
β2z12
)
◦
(−→
1 +
−→
β z′1
)
=
−→
1 w1 +
−→
β
(
w1z
′
1 + z11
)
+
−→
β2
(
z11z
′
1 + z12
)
+
−→
β3z12z
′
1.
The desired symbol w1 appears along the vector
−→
1 while the remaining 5 undesired symbols
align along 3 dimensions. Specifically, the undesired symbols w1z′1 and z11 align along the vector−→
β ; undesired symbols z11z′1 and z12 align along the vector
−→
β2 and undesired symbol z12z′1 appears
along the vector
−→
β3. This type of alignment, enabled by using the same
−→
β in the storage and query,
is indeed very useful and has been used previously by Freij-Hollanti et al. for MDS-TPIR [6].
However, note that we have a 5 dimensional space (all vectors are 5 × 1) and we are so far only
using 4 dimensions (one desired, three interference), so there is room for improvement.
In order to improve the efficiency of the retrieval scheme, suppose we try to retrieve another
symbol, w2, from the same desired message W = (w1, w2). The challenge is that because of the
X = 2 security requirement w2 is mixed with new (independent) noise symbols z21, z22 according
to an RS code parameterized by γ,
−→
1 w2 +
−→γ z21 +
−→
γ2z22, (33)
so any attempt to retrievew2 will add new interference terms. Since we already have 3 dimensions
of interference, the new interference added due to the noise protecting w2 must align completely
within the existing interference. This will be accomplished by cross-alignment, i.e., introducing
additional structure across the storage and query codes for the different symbols to be retrieved.
In particular, we will use the query vector −→γ ◦
(−→
1 +
−→
β z′1
)
to multiply with the stored variables
containing w1 (i.e.,
−→
1 w1 +
−→
β z11 +
−→
β2z12) and the query vector
−→
β ◦
(−→
1 +−→γ z′2
)
to multiply with
the stored variables containing w2 (i.e.,
−→
1 w2 +
−→γ z21 +
−→
γ2z22). The sum of the two multiplications
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is returned as the answer. Note that Hadamard products are commutative and associative. The
answers from the 5 servers are now expressed as follows.
−→γ ◦
(−→
1 w1 +
−→
β z11 +
−→
β2z12
)
◦
(−→
1 +
−→
β z′1
)
+
−→
β ◦ (−→1 w2 +−→γ z21 +
−→
γ2z22) ◦
(−→
1 +−→γ z′2
)
(34)
= −→γ w1 +−→β w2 +−→β ◦ −→γ
(
w1z
′
1 + z11 + w2z
′
2 + z21
)
+
−→
β2 ◦ −→γ (z11z′1 + z12) +
−→
β ◦
−→
γ2(z21z
′
2 + z22) +
−→
β3 ◦ −→γ z12z′1 +
−→
β ◦
−→
γ3z22z
′
2. (35)
Note that we cannot choose
−→
β = −→γ , because the two desired symbols (w1, w2) must not align in
the same dimension. Also note that by cross-multiplying the first set of answers with −→γ and the
second with
−→
β we have achieved cross alignment of 4 terms along
−→
β ◦ −→γ . However, we now have
5 dimensions occupied by interference, along the 5 vectors,
−→
β ◦ −→γ ,−→β2 ◦ −→γ ,−→β ◦ −→γ2,−→β3 ◦ −→γ ,−→β ◦ −→γ3.
Since the overall space is only 5 dimensional and we need two dimensions for desired symbols,
we need to restrict interference to no more than 3 dimensions. Surprisingly, it is possible to do this
by cross subspace alignment as we show next. Let us introduce a structural relationship between β
and γ. In particular, let us set,
−→
β =
−−−→
1 + α (36)
−→γ = −−−→2 + α (37)
so that the answers from the 5 servers are now expressed as,(−−−→
2 + α
)
w1 +
(−−−→
1 + α
)
w2 +
(−−−→
1 + α
)
◦
(−−−→
2 + α
)
I (38)
where the interference I is
I =
−→
1 (w1z
′
1 + z11 + w2z
′
2 + z21) +
(−−−→
1 + α
)
(z11z
′
1 + z12) +
(−−−→
2 + α
)
(z21z
′
1 + z22)
+
(−−−−−−−−→
1 + 2α+ α2
)
z12z
′
1 +
(−−−−−−−−→
4 + 4α+ α2
)
z22z
′
2. (39)
Note that there are still 5 interference vectors, no two of which align directly with each other.
However, the 5 interference vectors align into a 3 dimensional subspace of the 5 dimensional
vector space. This is what we mean by cross subspace alignment and it is essential to this work. To
see explicitly how the interference aligns into a 3 dimensional subspace, we can rewrite I as,
I =
−→
1 (w1z
′
1 + z11 + w2z
′
2 + z21 + z11z
′
1 + z12 + 2z21z
′
1 + 2z22 + z12z
′
1 + 4z22z
′
2)
+−→α (z11z′1 + z12 + z21z′1 + z22 + 2z12z′1 + 4z22z′2)
+
−→
α2(z12z
′
1 + z22z
′
2). (40)
Thus, due to cross subspace alignment, all of I aligns within a 3 dimensional space, leaving the
remaining 2 dimensions interference-free for the desired symbols. Exactly the same alignments
apply to all messages as explained in the formal descriptions of the schemes provided in this
paper.
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4 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us start with two useful lemmas. The first one shows that the desired message index is inde-
pendent of the messages, stored variables, queries and answers.
Lemma 1 For all k, k′ ∈ [1 : K], ∀T ∈ [1 : N ], |T | = T , we have
(Q
[k]
T , A
[k]
T , S[1:N ],W1, · · · ,WK) ∼ (Q[k
′]
T , A
[k′]
T , S[1:N ],W1, · · · ,WK) (41)
Proof: Since W1, · · · ,WK is a function of S[1:N ] and A[θ]T is a function of (Q[θ]T , ST ) (refer to (11)),
it suffices to prove I(θ;Q[θ]T , S[1:N ]) = 0. From (9), we have
I(Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ;S[1:N ]) = 0 (42)
⇒ I(Q[θ]T , θ;S[1:N ]) = 0 (43)
⇒ I(Q[θ]T ;S[1:N ]) = I(Q[θ]T ;S[1:N ]|θ) = 0 (44)
Next, we have,
I(θ;Q
[θ]
T , S[1:N ])
(9)
= I(θ;Q
[θ]
T |S[1:N ]) (45)
= H(Q
[θ]
T |S[1:N ])−H(Q[θ]T |S[1:N ], θ) (46)
(44)
= H(Q
[θ]
T )−H(Q[θ]T |θ) (47)
(10)
= 0 (48)

The second lemma is a statement of conditional independence of answers from one set of
servers from the queries to the rest of the servers.
Lemma 2 For all T ,X ⊂ [1 : N ], ∀k ∈ [1 : K],∀K ∈ [1 : K], we have
H(A
[k]
T |SX , Q[k][1:N ],WK) = H(A
[k]
T |SX , Q[k]T ,WK) (49)
Proof: It suffices to prove that I(A[k]T ;Q
[k]
[1:N ]|SX , Q
[k]
T ,WK) = 0. This proof is presented as fol-
lows.
I(A
[k]
T ;Q
[k]
[1:N ]|SX , Q
[k]
T ,WK) ≤ I(A[k]T , SX ,WK;Q[k][1:N ]|Q
[k]
T ) (50)
≤ I(A[k]T , S[1:N ],WK;Q[k][1:N ]|Q
[k]
T ) (51)
(8)(11)
= I(S[1:N ];Q
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
T ) (52)
(9)
= 0 (53)

The next lemma formalizes the intuition that because of the security constraint, the answers
from any X servers are, in some sense, not very useful. Specifically, after conditioning on the
information contained in any X servers, the answers from the remaining N −X servers must still
contain at least L more bits than the interference that is included in those answers. For a set X ,
its complement set is denoted as X , i.e., X = {n|n ∈ [1 : N ], n /∈ X}. We use Dn to denote the
expected number of symbols downloaded from Server n.
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Lemma 3 For all X ∈ [1 : N ], |X | = X , we have
L ≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −H(A[1]X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ],W1) (54)
Proof:
L = H(W1)
(12)
= I(W1;A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (55)
≤ I(W1;A[1][1:N ], SX |Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (56)
= I(W1;SX |Q[1][1:N ]) + I(W1;A
[1]
X , A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (57)
(11)
= I(W1;SX |Q[1][1:N ]) + I(W1;A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (58)
(9)
= I(W1, Q
[1]
[1:N ];SX ) + I(W1;A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (59)
(7)
= I(Q
[1]
[1:N ];SX |W1) + I(W1;A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (60)
≤ I(Q[1][1:N ];SX ,W1) + I(W1;A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (61)
(9)
= I(W1;A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ]) (62)
≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −H(A[1]X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ],W1) (63)

We may interpret the second term of the RHS of (54) as the interference term. To bound it, we
need the following recursive relation, stated in a lemma.
Lemma 4 For all X ∈ [1 : N ], |X | = X and for all k ∈ [1 : K], we have
H(A
[k]
X |SX , Q
[k]
[1:N ],W[1:k]) ≥
T
N −X
(
L+H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k+1])
)
, if N > X + T. (64)
H(A
[k]
X |SX , Q
[k]
[1:N ],W[1:k]) ≥ L+H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k+1]), if N ≤ X + T. (65)
Proof: First consider N > X + T . Consider any set T ⊂ X , |T | = T .
H(A
[k]
X |SX , Q
[k]
[1:N ],W[1:k]) ≥ H(A
[k]
T |SX , Q[k][1:N ],W[1:k]) (66)
(49)
= H(A
[k]
T |SX , Q[k]T ,W[1:k]) (67)
(41)
= H(A
[k+1]
T |SX , Q[k+1]T ,W[1:k]) (68)
(49)
= H(A
[k+1]
T |SX , Q[k+1][1:N ] ,W[1:k]) (69)
Averaging (69) over all choices of T and applying Han’s inequality, we have
H(A
[k]
X |SX , Q
[k]
[1:N ],W[1:k])
≥ T
N −XH(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k]) (70)
12
(11)(12)
=
T
N −XH(A
[k+1]
X ,Wk+1|SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k]) (71)
=
T
N −X
(
H(Wk+1|SX , Q[k+1][1:N ] ,W[1:k]) +H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k+1])
)
(72)
=
T
N −X
(
L+H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k+1])
)
(73)
where the last step uses L = H(Wk+1) and I(Wk+1;SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k]) = 0, proved as follows.
I(Wk+1;SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k])
(5)(6)
= I(Wk+1;SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] |W[1:k]) (74)
≤ I(W[1:k+1];SX , Q[k+1][1:N ] ) (75)
(7)
= I(W[1:k+1];Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] |SX ) (76)
≤ I(W[1:k+1], SX ;Q[k+1][1:N ] ) (77)
≤ I(S[1:N ];Q[k+1][1:N ] ) (78)
(9)
= 0 (79)
Next, consider N ≤ X + T . The proof is similar to that presented above. Note that |X | =
N −X ≤ T .
H(A
[k]
X |SX , Q
[k]
[1:N ],W[1:k])
(49)
= H(A
[k]
X |SX , Q
[k]
X ,W[1:k]) (80)
(41)
= H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
X ,W[1:k]) (81)
(49)
= H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k]) (82)
(11)(12)
= H(A
[k+1]
X ,Wk+1|SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k]) (83)
= H(Wk+1|SX , Q[k+1][1:N ] ,W[1:k]) +H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k+1]) (84)
(79)
= L+H(A
[k+1]
X |SX , Q
[k+1]
[1:N ] ,W[1:k+1]) (85)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4. 
Now let us apply Lemma 4 repeatedly for k = 1, 2, · · · . When N > X + T , we have
H(A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ],W1) ≥
T
N −X
(
L+H(A
[2]
X |SX , Q
[2]
[1:N ],W[1:2]
)
(86)
≥ T
N −X
(
L+
T
N −X
(
L+H(A
[3]
X |SX , Q
[3]
[1:N ],W[1:3]
))
(87)
≥ · · · (88)
≥ L
(
T
N −X +
(
T
N −X
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)K−1)
(89)
Similarly, when N ≤ X + T , we have
H(A
[1]
X |SX , Q
[1]
[1:N ],W1) ≥ L+H(A
[2]
X |SX , Q
[2]
[1:N ],W[1:2]) (90)
13
≥ · · · (91)
≥ L(K − 1) (92)
Substituting (89), (92) into (54), we have
L ≤
∑
n∈X
Dn − L
(
T
N −X +
(
T
N −X
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)K−1)
, if N > X + T. (93)
L ≤
∑
n∈X
Dn − L(K − 1), if N ≤ X + T. (94)
Averaging over all X , we have
L ≤
(
N −X
N
)
D − L
(
T
N −X +
(
T
N −X
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)K−1)
, if N > X + T. (95)
L ≤
(
N −X
N
)
D − L(K − 1), if N ≤ X + T. (96)
Finally since the rate is defined as R = L/D, we arrive at the final bound.
R ≤ N −X
N
(
1 +
T
N −X +
(
T
N −X
)2
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)K−1)−1
, if N > X + T. (97)
R ≤ N −X
N
× 1
K
, if N ≤ X + T. (98)
Thus
CXSTPIR(N,K,X, T ) ≤
(
N −X
N
)
CTPIR(N −X,K, T ), (99)
and the proof of Theorem 1 is complete. 
5 Proof of Theorem 2
Let each message consist of L = N − X symbols in Fq, q ≥ N , and append X instances of 0
symbols, to create artificial messages of length N ,
W¯k = (Wk1,Wk2 , · · · ,Wk(N−X), 0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
), ∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (100)
Corresponding to each messageWk, letZk = (Zk1, Zk2, · · · , ZkX) ∈ FXq beX independent uniform
noise symbols, to be used for X-security. Let Zk be encoded with an (N,X) MDS code to produce
Z¯k ∈ FNq . For each k ∈ [1 : K] and n ∈ [1 : N ], the nth server stores the nth symbol of W¯k + Z¯k.
Thus, each server stores a total of K symbols. The MDS property of Z¯k ensures that the data
storage is X-secure. Retrieval is trivial — in order to retrieve the desired message Wθ, the user
simply downloads everything from all servers. Since the queries do not depend on the desired
message, the scheme is N -private, so it is also T -private. The rate achieved is N−XNK which matches
the capacity for this setting. 
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6 Proof of Theorem 3
Let us present an XSTPIR scheme for arbitrary X , T , N , K, that is asymptotically optimal (as
K →∞). The asymptotic capacity is zero for N ≤ X+T , so we only need to consider N > X+T .
Throughout this scheme we will set
L = N −X − T (101)
and we will use the compact notation,
∆ =
L∏
i=1
(i+ α). (102)
∆n will represent the value of ∆ when α is replaced with αn.
Each message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K], consists of L = N −X − T symbols, Wk = (Wk1,Wk2, · · · ,WkL)
from a finite field Fq. The field Fq is assumed to have size q ≥ L + N , and characteristic greater
than L − 1. For the design of this scheme, we will need constants αn, n ∈ [1 : N ] that are distinct
elements of G,
G = {α ∈ Fq : α+ i 6= 0, ∀i ∈ [1 : L]}. (103)
Such αn, n ∈ [1 : N ] must exist because q ≥ L+N . These constants will be globally known. In the
following description of the scheme, we will explain explicitly how the values of these constants
are chosen. For now, let us note that because the characteristic of the field is assumed to be greater
than L− 1, the values α+ 1, α+ 2, · · · , α+ L are distinct for any α ∈ Fq.
Let us split the messages into L vectors, so that Wl = (W1l,W2l, · · · ,WKl), l ∈ [1 : L], contains
the lth symbol of every message. Let Zlx, l ∈ [1 : L], x ∈ [1 : X], be independent uniformly random
noise vectors from F1×Kq , that are used to guarantee security. Similarly, letZ′lt, l ∈ [1 : L], t ∈ [1 : T ],
be independent uniformly random noise vectors from FK×1q , that are used to guarantee privacy.
The independence between noise vectors, messages, and the user’s desired message index θ is
specified as follows.
H
(
(Wl)l∈[1:L] , (Zlx)l∈[1:L],x∈[1:X] ,
(
Z′lt
)
l∈[1:L],t∈[1:T ] , θ
)
= H((Wl)l∈[1:L]) +H(θ) +KL(X + T )
(104)
in q-ary units. Let Qθ represent7 the θth column of the K ×K identity matrix, so it contains a 1 in
the θth position and zeros everywhere else. Note that
(W1Qθ,W2Qθ, · · · ,WLQθ) = (Wθ1,Wθ2, · · · ,WθL) = Wθ (105)
is the message desired by the user. A succinct summary of the storage at each server, the queries,
and a partitioning of signal and interference dimensions contained in the answers from each
server, is provided below.
7Note that the XSTPIR scheme described in this section works even if Qθ is an arbitrary vector, i.e., if instead of
retrieving one of the K messages, the user wishes to compute an arbitrary linear function of the K messages over Fq .
Thus, the scheme automatically settles the asymptotic capacity of the natural X-secure and T -private generalization of
the linear private computation problem introduced in [33] (also known as linear private function retrieval [34]).
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Server ‘n’ (Replace α,∆ with αn,∆n)
Storage W1 + (1 + α)Z11 + · · ·+ (1 + α)XZ1X ,
(Sn) W2 + (2 + α)Z21 + · · ·+ (2 + α)XZ2X ,
...
WL + (L+ α)ZL1 + · · ·+ (L+ α)XZLX
Query ∆1+α
(
Qθ + (1 + α)Z
′
11 + · · ·+ (1 + α)TZ′1T
)
,
(Q
[θ]
n )
∆
2+α
(
Qθ + (2 + α)Z
′
21 + · · ·+ (2 + α)TZ′2T
)
,
...
∆
L+α
(
Qθ + (L+ α)Z
′
L1 + · · ·+ (L+ α)TZ′LT
)
Desired symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1, · · · ,−−−−−−−→(L+ α)−1
)
Interference appears along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−→
1 ,
−−−−→
(1 + α), · · · ,−−−−−−−−−−→(1 + α)X+T−1,−−−−→(2 + α), · · · ,−−−−−−−−−−→(2 + α)X+T−1, · · · ,
· · · ,−−−−−→(L+ α), · · · ,−−−−−−−−−−→(L+ α)X+T−1
)
Initially, the user knows only his desired message index θ and the noise terms Z′lt, l ∈ [1 :
L], t ∈ [1 : T ], all of which are privately generated by the user. Each server n ∈ [1 : N ] knows
only its stored information Sn. The storage Sn at Server n may be viewed as a 1× LK row vector
formed by concatenating the L row vectors, Wl +
∑X
x=1(l + αn)
xZlx, l ∈ [1 : L]. Similarly, the
query Q[θ]n may be viewed as an LK × 1 column vector formed by concatenating the L column
vectors, ∆nl+αn
(
Qθ +
∑T
t=1(l + αn)
tZ′lt
)
, l ∈ [1 : L].
Upon receiving the query Q[θ]n from the user, Server n responds with the answer A
[θ]
n that is
exactly one symbol in Fq, found by multiplying Sn with Q
[θ]
n .
A[θ]n = SnQ
[θ]
n . (106)
This produces a single equation in a total of L(X + 1)(T + 1) terms. Out of these, L terms are
desired message symbols WlQθ, l ∈ [1 : L], and the remaining L(X + 1)(T + 1) − L terms are
undesired, or interference terms. The interference terms include LT terms of the type WlZ′lt, LX
terms of the type ZlxQθ, and LXT terms of the type ZlxZ′lt. The user obtains one such equation
from each server, for a total of N equations, from which he must be able to retrieve his L desired
symbols. The key to this is the alignment of L(X + 1)(T + 1) − L interference terms into N − L
dimensions, leaving L dimensions free from interference from which the L desired symbols can
be decoded.
First let us identify the desired signal dimensions, i.e., the vectors along which desired symbols
are seen by the user. Each answer A[θ]n contains the desired symbols ∆nl+αnWlQθ =
∆n
l+αn
Wθl, l ∈ [1 :
16
L]. These L desired symbols appear along the following L vectors.
∆1
1+α1
∆2
1+α2
...
∆N
1+αN
 ,

∆1
2+α1
∆2
2+α2
...
∆N
2+αN
 , · · · ,

∆1
L+α1
∆2
L+α2
...
∆N
L+αN
 , −→∆ ◦
(−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1, · · · ,
−−−−−−−→
(L+ α)−1
)
. (107)
Recall that ◦ represents the Hadamard product. Similarly, the vectors along which interference
symbols appear are identified as follows.
−→
∆ ◦
(−→
1 ,
−−−−→
(1 + α), · · · ,
−−−−−−−−−−→
(1 + α)X+T−1,
−−−−→
(2 + α), · · · ,
−−−−−−−−−−→
(2 + α)X+T−1, · · · ,
· · · ,−−−−−→(L+ α), · · · ,
−−−−−−−−−−→
(L+ α)X+T−1
)
. (108)
Thus, the vector of answers from all N servers can be expressed as
−−→
A[θ] =
L∑
l=1
Wθl
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(l + α)−1 +
L∑
l=1
X+T−1∑
i=0
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−→
(l + α)iIli (109)
for some interference terms Ili that are sums of variousWlZ′lt, ZlxQθ, and ZlxZ
′
lt terms. The exact
form of Ili terms is not important for our analysis. Using binomial expansion to write each
−−−−−→
(l + α)i
vector as
∑i
j=0
(
i
j
)
lj
−−→
αi−j , and grouping terms by the vectors
−→
αi, we can write,
−−→
A[θ] =
L∑
l=1
Wθl
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(l + α)−1 +
X+T−1∑
i=0
−→
∆ ◦
−→
αiI ′i. (110)
Thus, all interference is aligned within the subspace spanned by vectors
−→
∆ ,
−→
∆◦−→α , . . . ,−→∆ ◦ −−−−−→αX+T−1.
As explained in Section 3.2.3, this is because of cross subspace alignment.
In matrix notation, we have,
−−→
A[θ] =

A
[θ]
1
A
[θ]
2
...
A
[θ]
N
 = MN

Wθ1
...
WθL
I ′0
...
I ′(X+T−1)

(111)
where the N ×N square matrix (note that L+X + T = N )
MN =

∆1
1+α1
· · · ∆1L+α1 ∆1 ∆1α1 · · · ∆1αX+T−11
∆2
1+α2
· · · ∆2L+α2 ∆2 ∆2α2 · · · ∆2αX+T−12
...
∆N
1+αN
· · · ∆NL+αN ∆N ∆NαN · · · ∆Nα
X+T−1
N
 (112)
=
[−→
∆ ◦ −−−−−−→(1 + α)−1 · · · −→∆ ◦ −−−−−−−→(L+ α)−1 −→∆ −→∆ ◦ −→α · · · −→∆ ◦ −−−−−→αX+T−1
]
(113)
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is called the decoding matrix. Evidently, if the decoding matrix is invertible, then the user can
recover his L desired message symbols. We show that if αn, n ∈ [1 : N ] are distinct elements of
G, then MN is invertible. This result is stated in the following lemma. Note that in our design,
we have chosen αn as distinct elements, so Lemma 5 guarantees that the scheme satisfies the
correctness constraint. Fixing distinct values of α1, · · · , αN completes the design of the scheme.
Lemma 5 The decoding matrixMN is invertible if all αn, n ∈ [1 : N ] are distinct.
Proof: To set up the proof by contradiction, suppose on the contrary thatMN is singular. Then
there must exist cn ∈ Fq, n ∈ [1 : N ], at least one of which is non-zero, such that
c1
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1 + · · ·+ cL−→∆ ◦
−−−−−−−→
(L+ α)−1 + cL+1
−→
∆ + cL+2
−→
∆ ◦−→α + · · ·+ cN−→∆ ◦
−−−−−→
αX+T−1 =
−→
0 (114)
where
−→
0 is the vector whose elements are all 0. Now consider n-th row of (114).
c1
∆n
1 + αn
+ · · ·+ cL ∆n
L+ αn
+ cL+1∆n + cL+2∆nαn + · · ·+ cN∆nαX+T−1n = 0. (115)
From (102) and (103), we know that ∆n 6= 0. Then αn must be the root of the following polynomial
g(α) =
L∑
i=1
ci
(
∆
i+ α
)
+
N∑
i=L+1
ci∆α
i−(L+1) (116)
Note that ∆ (as a function of α) has order L and i + α is a factor of ∆ (refer to (102)), so g(α) has
order at mostN − 1. If g(α) is a non-zero polynomial, then it can have at most N − 1 roots over Fq.
Now αn, n ∈ [1 : N ] are N distinct roots of g(α), thus g(α) must be the zero polynomial, i.e., the
coefficients of all monomials in g(α) must be zero. The coefficient of αN−1 is cN so we must have
cN = 0. Then, the remaining coefficient of αN−2 is cN−1, so we must have cN−1 = 0. Similarly, we
find cL+1 = cL+2 = · · · = cN = 0, leaving us with
g(α) =
L∑
i=1
ci
(
∆
i+ α
)
. (117)
Now, if this g(α) is the zero polynomial, then it must be zero for every α ∈ Fq. Choosing α such8
that (i+ α) = 0, gives us ci = 0 for every i ∈ [1 : L]. Thus, we have c1 = c2 = · · · = cN = 0. This is
a contradiction since we assumed that at least one of cn, n ∈ [1 : N ] is non-zero. Thus, the proof is
complete. 
Now consider the security guarantee. For any X colluding servers, i1, i2, · · · , iX , the X obser-
vations, Ukl1, · · · , UklX , of each message symbol Wkl, k ∈ [1 : K], l ∈ [1 : L], are protected by noise
terms as follows.Ukl1...
UklX
 =
Wkl...
Wkl
+

l + αi1 (l + αi1)
2 · · · (l + αi1)X
l + αi2 (l + αi2)
2 · · · (l + αi2)X
...
...
...
l + αiX (l + αiX )
2 · · · (l + αiX )X

︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
Zl1(k)...
ZlX(k)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
(118)
8Note that ∆
i+α
is simply a compact notation for
∏
l∈[1:L],l 6=i(l + α), i.e., it only means that the (i + α) factor is
eliminated from ∆, so there is no ‘division by 0’ when we set i+ α = 0 in ∆
i+α
.
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= Wkl
1...
1

︸︷︷︸
1
+

l + αi1 0 · · · 0
0 l + αi2 · · · 0
0 0
. . . 0
0 0 · · · l + αiX


1 l + αi1 · · · (l + αi1)X−1
1 l + αi2 · · · (l + αi2)X−1
...
...
...
1 l + αiX · · · (l + αiX )X−1

Zl1(k)...
ZlX(k)
 .
(119)
where Zlx(k) is the kth element of the vector Zlx. Note that P is a product of a diagonal matrix
which is invertible because (l + αij ) are non-zero, and a Vandermonde matrix which is invertible
because (l + αij ) are distinct. Therefore, P is invertible, and the observations are independent of
the message symbols as shown below.
I(Wkl; (Uklx)x∈[1:X]) = I(Wkl;Wkl1+ PZ) = I(Wkl;WklP
−11+ Z) = I(Wkl;Z) = 0. (120)
Furthermore, since the noise terms protecting each message symbol Wkl, k ∈ [1 : K], l ∈ [1 : L],
i.e., Zlx(k), x ∈ [1 : X] are independent across (k, l, x), security is preserved for all data.
The noise terms protecting each query also have the same structure and independence proper-
ties by design. Therefore, it follows from the same reasoning that user’s privacy is protected from
any T colluding servers.
Finally, note that the user is able to retrieve L = N −X − T desired q-ary symbols by down-
loadingN q-ary symbols, one from each server. The rate achieved is L/N = 1− (X+T )/N , which
is the asymptotic capacity for this general setting. This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 
6.1 Example: (X = 1) Secure, (T = 1) Private Scheme with N = 5 Servers
Each message consists of L = 3 symbols from a finite field Fq, q ≥ N + L = 8, and characteristic
greater than 2. For this setting, ∆ = (1 + α)(2 + α)(3 + α).
Server ‘n’ (Replace α,∆ with αn,∆n)
Storage W1 + (1 + α)Z1,
(Sn) W2 + (2 + α)Z2,
W3 + (3 + α)Z3
Query ∆1+α
(
Qθ + (1 + α)Z
′
1
)
,
(Q
[θ]
n )
∆
2+α
(
Qθ + (2 + α)Z
′
2
)
,
∆
3+α
(
Qθ + (3 + α)Z
′
3
)
Desired symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(3 + α)−1
)
Interference symbols appear along vectors−→
∆ ◦
(−→
1 ,
−−−→
1 + α,
−−−→
2 + α,
−−−→
3 + α
)
The answers from all N = 5 servers may be written explicitly as,
−−→
A[θ] =
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1W1Qθ +
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1W2Qθ +
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(3 + α)−1W3Qθ
+
−→
∆
(
W1Z
′
1 +W2Z
′
2 +W3Z
′
3 + Z1Qθ + Z2Qθ + Z3Qθ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I10+I20+I30
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+
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−→(1 + α) (Z1Z′1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
+
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−→(2 + α) (Z2Z′2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I21
+
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−→(3 + α) (Z3Z′3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I31
(121)
=
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1Wθ1 +
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1Wθ2 +
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(3 + α)−1Wθ3
+
−→
∆(I10 + I20 + I30 + I11 + 2I21 + 3I31) +
−→
∆ ◦ −→α (I11 + I21 + I31). (122)
Privacy and security are guaranteed since 1 + αn 6= 0,∀n ∈ [1 : 5], the messages and queries are
hidden behind the noise.
Interference terms align into the space spanned by the two vectors,
−→
∆ ,
−→
∆ ◦ −→α , while the 3
symbols of the desired message appear along
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−−−→(1 + α)−1,−→∆ ◦ −−−−−−→(2 + α)−1,−→∆ ◦ −−−−−−→(3 + α)−1. In-
dependence of the 3 desired signal dimensions from the two interference dimensions is trivially
verified, because the highest exponent of α along desired signal dimensions is 2, but each in-
terference dimension has an α3 term (contributed by ∆). Independence of the 3 desired signal
dimensions among themselves is also easily verified, because for
c1(2 + α)(3 + α) + c2(1 + α)(3 + α) + c3(1 + α)(2 + α) (123)
to be the zero polynomial it must be zero everywhere, but in that case, setting α + i = 0 for
i = 1, 2, 3, leads us to c1 = c2 = c3 = 0, thus proving their independence. The rate achieved is 3/5,
which matches the asymptotic capacity for this setting.
6.2 Example: (X = 2) Secure, (T = 1) Private Scheme with N = 4 Servers
Each message consists of L = 1 symbol from a finite field Fq, q ≥ N + L = 5. ∆ = (1 + α).
Server ‘n’ (Replace α,∆ with αn,∆n)
Storage (Sn) W1 + (1 + α)Z11 + (1 + α)2Z12
Query (Q[θ]n ) Qθ + (1 + α)Z′1
Desired symbols appear along vector−→
1
Interference symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−→
1 ,
−−−→
1 + α,
−−−−−→
(1 + α)2
)
The answers from all N = 4 servers may be written explicitly as,
−−→
A[θ] =
−→
1W1Qθ +
−−−−→
(1 + α)
(
W1Z
′
1 + Z11Qθ
)
+
−−−−−→
(1 + α)2
(
Z11Z
′
1 + Z12Qθ
)
+
−−−−−→
(1 + α)3Z12Z
′
1 (124)
=
−→
1 Wθ1 +
−→
∆ ◦
−→1 (W1Z′1 + Z11Qθ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I10
+
−−−−→
(1 + α)
(
Z11Z
′
1 + Z12Qθ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
+
−−−−−→
(1 + α)2 Z12Z
′
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
I12
 (125)
=
−→
1 Wθ1 +
−→
∆ (I10 + I11 + I12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I′0
+
−→
∆ ◦ −→α (I11 + 2I12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I′1
+
−→
∆ ◦
−→
α2 (I12)︸︷︷︸
I′2
. (126)
Interference aligns in the space spanned by the three vectors,
−→
∆ ,
−→
∆ ◦ −→α ,−→∆ ◦ −→α2, while the de-
sired symbol appears along the vector of all ones. The independence of these directions is easily
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established. Privacy is guaranteed because 1 + αn 6= 0, ∀n ∈ [1 : 4], so the queries are hidden
behind random noise. Security is guaranteed because for anyX = 2 colluding servers, i and j, the
independent noise protecting each message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K],[
1 + αi (1 + αi)
2
1 + αj (1 + αj)
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pij
[
Z11(k)
Z12(k)
]
=
[
1 + αi 0
0 1 + αj
] [
1 (1 + αi)
1 (1 + αj)
] [
Z11(k)
Z12(k)
]
(127)
spans X = 2 dimensions, because Pij is invertible for distinct and non-zero values of (1 +αi), (1 +
αj). The rate achieved is 1/4 which matches the asymptotic capacity for this setting.
6.3 Example: (X = 1) Secure, (T = 2) Private Scheme with N = 5 Servers
Each message consists of L = N −X − T = 2 symbols from Fq, q ≥ 7.
∆ = (1 + α)(2 + α). (128)
Server ‘n’ (Replace α,∆ with αn,∆n)
Storage W1 + (1 + α)Z1,
(Sn) W2 + (2 + α)Z2
Query ∆1+α
(
Qθ + (1 + α)Z
′
11 + (1 + α)
2Z′12
)
,
(Q
[θ]
n )
∆
2+α
(
Qθ + (2 + α)Z
′
21 + (2 + α)
2Z′22
)
Desired symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1
)
Interference symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−→
1 ,
−−−→
1 + α,
−−−−−→
(1 + α)2,
−−−→
2 + α,
−−−−−→
(2 + α)2
)
The answers from all N = 5 servers may be written explicitly as,
−−→
A[θ] =
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1W1Qθ +
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1W2Qθ (129)
+
−→
∆
(
W1Z
′
11 +W2Z
′
21 + Z1Qθ + Z2Qθ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I10+I20
+
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−→
(2 + α)2 Z2Z
′
22︸ ︷︷ ︸
I22
+
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−→(1 + α) (Z1Z′11 +W1Z′12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
+
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−→(2 + α) (Z2Z′21 +W2Z′22)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I21
+
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−→
(1 + α)2 Z1Z
′
12︸ ︷︷ ︸
I12
=
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1Wθ1 +
−→
∆ ◦
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1Wθ2 +
−→
∆(I10 + I20 + I11 + 2I21 + I12 + 4I22)
+
−→
∆ ◦ −→α (I11 + I21 + 2I12 + 4I22) +−→∆ ◦
−→
α2(I12 + I22). (130)
Thus, interference aligns into the space spanned by the 3 vectors:
−→
∆ ,
−→
∆ ◦ −→α ,−→∆ ◦ −→α2, while the 2
desired symbols appear along
−→
∆ ◦ −−−−−−→(1 + α)−1,−→∆ ◦ −−−−−−→(2 + α)−1. Note that the highest exponent of α
along a desired signal dimension is 1, but every interference dimension contains α2 (contributed
by ∆), so the desired signals are independent of the interference. The independence of desired
21
signals among themselves is also easily verified because if c1 ∆1+α + c2
∆
2+α = c1(2 + α) + c2(1 + α)
is the zero polynomial, then by substituting i+ α = 0 for i = 1, 2 we find that we must have c1 =
c2 = 0. Privacy and security are guaranteed by the MDS coded independent noise terms mixed
with the message and query symbols. The rate achieved is 2/5, which matches the asymptotic
capacity for this setting.
6.4 Example: (X = 2) Secure, (T = 2) Private Scheme with N = 7 Servers
Each message consists of L = 3 symbols from a finite field Fq, of size q ≥ 10 and characteristic
greater than 2.
∆ = (1 + α)(2 + α)(3 + α).
Server ‘n’ (Replace α,∆ with αn,∆n)
Storage W1 + (1 + α)Z11 + (1 + α)2Z12,
(Sn) W2 + (2 + α)Z21 + (2 + α)
2Z22,
W3 + (3 + α)Z31 + (3 + α)
2Z32
Query ∆1+α
(
Qθ + (1 + α)Z
′
11 + (1 + α)
2Z′12
)
,
(Q
[θ]
n )
∆
2+α
(
Qθ + (2 + α)Z
′
21 + (2 + α)
2Z′22
)
,
∆
3+α
(
Qθ + (3 + α)Z
′
31 + (3 + α)
2Z′32
)
Desired symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−−−−−−→
(1 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(2 + α)−1,
−−−−−−→
(3 + α)−1
)
Interference symbols appear along vectors
−→
∆ ◦
(−→
1 ,
−−−→
1 + α,
−−−−−→
(1 + α)2,
−−−−−→
(1 + α)3,
−−−→
2 + α,
−−−−−→
(2 + α)2,
−−−−−→
(2 + α)3,
−−−→
3 + α,
−−−−−→
(3 + α)2,
−−−−−→
(3 + α)3
)
Interference aligns into the space spanned by the 4 vectors:
−→
∆ ,
−→
∆ ◦ −→α ,−→∆ ◦ −→α2,−→∆ ◦ −→α3. Indepen-
dence of desired signals from interference is trivially verified – highest exponent of α along any
desired signal dimension is 2, but each interference dimension has an α3 term (contributed by ∆).
The desired signal dimensions are easily verified to be linearly independent among themselves
because in order for
c1(2 + α)(3 + α) + c2(1 + α)(3 + α) + c3(1 + α)(2 + α) (131)
to be the zero polynomial it must be zero everywhere, but in that case, setting α + i = 0 for
i = 1, 2, 3 leads us to c1 = c2 = c3 = 0. Privacy and security are guaranteed by the MDS coded
independent noise terms mixed with the message and query symbols. The rate achieved is 3/7,
which matches the asymptotic capacity for this setting.
7 Proof of Theorem 4
In Section 6 we presented an XSTPIR scheme for arbitrary X,T,N,K that achieves capacity as
K →∞. Since the scheme also works for any K, a natural starting point for finite K settings is to
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apply the same scheme. A key insight here is that the rate achieved by the scheme improves as K
decreases. Let us elaborate. Note that the query Q[θ]n that is sent to each server is uniformly dis-
tributed in FLKq . Therefore, with probability 1qLK , the query vector is the all zero vector. Whenever
this happens, no download is needed from the server. Thus, the average download is reduced by
the factor (1− 1/qLK) and the rate achieved is expressed as follows.
Lemma 6 The asymptotically capacity achieving XSTPIR scheme of Section 6 achieves the rate
R =
(
1− 1
qKL
)−1(
1−
(
X + T
N
))
(132)
for arbitrary X,L,K,N values, where N > X + T .
Note that N ≤ X + T is excluded as the degenerate setting where we already know the capacity
for all parameters, according to Theorem 2. Remarkably, the rate in Lemma 6 depends on the
message size L and the field size q used by the scheme. As presented, the scheme uses q ≥ L+N
and L = N −X − T . So the achieved rate for finite K becomes
R =
(
1− 1
(2N −X − T )K(N−X−T )
)−1(
1−
(
X + T
N
))
. (133)
Consider the simplest non-trivial setting of interest, i.e., the setting for Theorem 4, where T =
X = 1, N = 3 and K is arbitrary. The scheme of Section 6 uses L = 1, q ≥ 4, so the rate achieved
for arbitrary K is
R =
1
3
(
1− 1
4K
)−1
. (134)
However, note that if the field size could be reduced to q = 2, then the rate achieved by the scheme
would become
1
3
(
1− 1
2K
)−1
=
2
3
(
1− 12
1− 1
2K
)
=
2
3
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
22
+ · · ·+ 1
2K−1
)−1
which matches the capacity upper bound from Theorem 1. Surprisingly, this can be done with
some modification to the structure of the scheme, as explained below.
Suppose each message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] consists of L = 1 symbol (bit) from F2. Let W =
(W1,W2, · · · ,WK) be a random row vector in F1×K2 , containing all messages. Let Z and Z′ be
uniformly random noise vectors from F1×K2 and F
K×1
2 , that are used to guarantee data security
and user privacy, respectively. The noise vectors are independent of each other and of the message
vector and θ, i.e.,H(W,Z,Z′, θ) = H(W)+H(Z)+H(Z′)+H(θ). LetQθ represent the θth column
of IK (the K ×K identity matrix). Note that WQθ = Wθ is the message desired by the user. The
storage at the servers, the queries and the answers are listed below.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3
Storage Sn W + Z W + ZB Z
Query Q[θ]n Z′ Qθ + Z′ (IK +B)Z′ +BQθ
Answer A[θ]n WZ′ + ZZ′ WQθ +WZ′ + ZBZ′ + ZBQθ ZZ′ + ZBZ′ + ZBQθ
where B is a K ×K deterministic binary matrix such that B and IK +B are both full rank. Any
such choice ofBwill work for our scheme. The existence of suchB is established in the following
lemma whose proof appears in Appendix A.
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Lemma 7 For allK ≥ 2, there exists a matrix B ∈ FK×K2 such that B and IK +B are both invertible.
Now, let us check the correctness, security and privacy of this scheme. The scheme is obviously
correct because by adding the three answers shown in the table above, the user recovers Wθ. It
is obviously secure because B is invertible, so ZB ∼ Z, is still uniform noise independent of W.
And similarly, it is also obviously private, because IK + B is also invertible, so (IK + B)Z′ ∼ Z′
is still uniform noise independent of BQθ. Thus, surprisingly, we have achieved the capacity of
XSTPIR for arbitrary K, when X = T = 1 and N = 3, completing the proof of Theorem 4. 
8 Conclusion
The XSTPIR problem is timely due to the growing importance of privacy and security concerns
in modern information storage and retrieval systems. It is a conceptually rich topic that reveals
new insights into alignment of noise terms, dependence of coding and query structures, cost of
symmetric security, significance of field size for the rate of information retrieval, etc. As indicated
by various open problems identified here, XSTPIR is a fertile research avenue for future work. In
particular, the capacity characterization for arbitrary K could reveal fundamentally new schemes
for PIR. Especially intriguing would be the role that field size might play in such a result. Capacity
of Sym-XSTPIR is another promising open problem. XSTPIR with constraints on the amount of
storage per server, coded storage, multi-message retrieval are other open problems that merit
investigation.
A Proof of Lemma 7
Let Jk denote the k × k anti-diagonal identity matrix, and let 0k1×k2 denote the k1 × k2 matrix
where all elements are equal to 0 (when k1 = k2, this notation is further simplified to 0k1). Define
I′k =
[
Ik 0k×1
01×k 0
]
. (135)
Choose B as follows.
B =

[
IK
2
JK
2
JK
2
0K
2
]
, if K is even,
 JK+12 + I′K−12 + IK+12 JK−1201×K−1
2
JK−1
2
0K−1
2
×1 0K−1
2
 , if K is odd.
(136)
For example,
when K = 4: B =

1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 , and when K = 5: B =

0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
 . (137)
24
Let us show that B and IK +B are both invertible.
First, considerB. Regardless of whetherK is even or odd,B is an upper anti-triangular matrix
where all anti-diagonal elements are 1 so that det(B) = 1 and B has full rank.
Next, consider IK +B.
When K is even: IK +B =
[
IK
2
0K
2
0K
2
IK
2
]
+
[
IK
2
JK
2
JK
2
0K
2
]
=
[
0K
2
JK
2
JK
2
IK
2
]
(138)
⇒ det(IK +B) = 1. (139)
When K is odd: IK +B =
[
IK+1
2
0K+1
2
×K−1
2
0K−1
2
×K+1
2
IK−1
2
]
+
 JK+12 + I′K−12 + IK+12 JK−1201×K−1
2
JK−1
2
0K−1
2
×1 0K−1
2

(140)
=
 JK+12 + I′K−12 JK−1201×K−1
2
JK−1
2
0K−1
2
×1 IK−1
2
 (141)
⇒ det(IK +B) = det
(
JK+1
2
+ I′K−1
2
+
[
JK−1
2
01×K−1
2
]
I−1K−1
2
[
JK−1
2
0K−1
2
×1
])
(142)
= det
(
JK+1
2
+ I′K−1
2
+ I′K−1
2
)
= det
(
JK+1
2
)
= 1 (143)
where (142) follows from the following formula on the determinant of a block matrix that is made
up of matrices A,B,C,D with proper dimensions and D is invertible.
det
(
A B
C D
)
= det(D) det
(
A−BD−1C) . (144)
The proof is thus complete. 
B Proof of Corollaries 1, 2, 3, 4
The proof of Corollary 1 is trivial because imposing the symmetric security constraint cannot in-
crease capacity.
B.1 Proof of Corollary 2
To prove Corollary 2 we provide a scheme as follows. Each message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K], consists
of L = 1 symbol from some finite field Fq. Let Zx,k,m, x ∈ [1 : X], k ∈ [1 : K],m ∈ [1 : K] be
independent uniform noise symbols from Fq. The subscript, m, in Zx,k,m is interpreted moduloK,
i.e., Zx,k,m = Zx,k,m+K . The storage at each server is specified as,
Sn = {Zn,k,m, k ∈ [1 : K],m ∈ [1 : K]}, n ∈ [1 : X], (145)
Sn =
{
Wk +
X∑
x=1
Zx,k,m, k ∈ [1 : K],m ∈ [1 : K]
}
, n = N. (146)
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The queries from each server are specified as,
Q[θ]n : Ask for {Zn,k,mo , k ∈ [1 : K]}, n ∈ [1 : X], (147)
Q[θ]n : Ask for {Wk +
X∑
x=1
Zx,k,mo−θ+k, k ∈ [1 : K]}, n = N, (148)
where mo is chosen privately and uniformly randomly by the user from [1 : K]. Thus, in or-
der to retrieve 1 desired message symbol, the user downloads a total of KN symbols from all
servers. The scheme is X-secure because each message symbol is protected by independent uni-
form noise terms. It is correct because for k = θ the download from Server N , contains the symbol
Wθ +
∑X
x=1 Zx,θ,mo and the downloads from the first X servers include all the noise terms Zx,θ,mo .
The scheme is private because mo is chosen uniformly and privately by the user. It satisfies sym-
metric security because all the undesired message symbols Wk, k 6= θ, contained in the answers
are protected by noise terms Zx,k,mo−θ+k and these noise terms are independent of the noise terms
downloaded from servers n ∈ [1 : X] because mo − θ + k 6= mo when k 6= θ. The rate achieved is
1
KN , which is the capacity for this setting. 
Note that in the Sym-XSPIR scheme described above, each server stores K2 symbols, when
the total data is only KL = K symbols. Thus, this Sym-XSPIR scheme takes advantage of uncon-
strained storage when K is large, more so than the XSTPIR schemes which store no more than KL
symbols at each server.
B.2 Proof of Corollary 3
To prove Corollary 3, we show that the scheme presented in Section 6 automatically guarantees
symmetric security when T = 1. Define
Wci = {Wl, l ∈ [1 : L], l 6= i} (149)
Zcij = {Zlx, l ∈ [1 : L], x ∈ [1 : X], (l, x) 6= (i, j)}. (150)
We need to prove that beyond the information that the user must have, i.e.,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ, he cannot
learn anything about the messages W[1:L] from the answers A
[θ]
[1:N ].
I
(
W[1:L];A
[θ]
[1:N ] |Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
=
∑
l∈[1:L]
I
(
Wl;A
[θ]
[1:N ] |W[1:l−1],Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
(151)
≤
∑
l∈[1:L]
I
(
Wl;A
[θ]
[1:N ] |Wcl ,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
(152)
≤
∑
l∈[1:L]
I
(
Wl;A
[θ]
[1:N ] | Zcl1,Wcl ,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
(153)
where we repeatedly used the fact that I(A;B | C) ≤ I(A;B | C,D) if I(A;D | C) = 0 and the
facts that
I(Wl;W[l+1:L] |W[1:l−1],Wθ, Q[θ][1:N ], θ) = 0 (154)
I
(
Wl;Z
c
l1 |Wcl ,Wθ, Q[θ][1:N ], θ
)
= 0 (155)
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that follow from the indepenence of messages, queries, and the noise terms, by construction of
the scheme in Section 6. To prove Corollary 3 it suffices to show that each of the terms in the
summation is zero. Without loss of generality, let us consider l = 1. Because of the conditioning
on Zc11,W
c
1,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ, we can subtract the contributions from these terms, whose values are
fixed, from A[θ]n , leaving us with only
A′[θ]n = (W1 + (1 + αn)Z11)
(
∆n
1 + αn
)(
Qθ + (1 + αn)Z
′
1
)
(156)
=
(
∆n
1 + αn
)
W1Qθ + ∆n(W1Z
′
1 + Z11Qθ) + ∆n(1 + αn)Z11Z
′
1 (157)
=
(
∆n
1 + αn
)
Wθ1 + ∆n(W1Z
′
1 + Z11(θ)) + ∆n(1 + αn)Z11Z
′
1 (158)
where Z11(i) is the ith element of the vector Z11. Note that Wθ1 is also a constant because of
the conditioning on Wθ. Given Zc11,W
c
1,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ, the random variable A
[θ]
[1:N ] is an invertible
function of A′[θ][1:N ].
I
(
W1;A
[θ]
[1:N ] | Zc11,Wc1,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
(159)
= I
(
W1;A
′[θ]
[1:N ] | Zc11,Wc1,Wθ, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
(160)
= I
(
W1;A
′[θ]
[1:N ] |Wθ1, Q
[θ]
[1:N ], θ
)
(161)
≤ I(W1;W1Z′1 + Z11(θ),Z11Z′1 |Wθ1,Qθ, θ) (162)
≤ I(W1;W1Z′1 + Z11(θ),Z11Z′1 |Wθ1,Qθ,Z′1, θ) (163)
= 0. (164)
In (162) we used the fact that given Wθ1, the random variable A′
[θ]
[1:N ] is a function of W1Z
′
1 +
Z11(θ),Z11Z
′
1 because of (158), and the fact that for any random variables A,B,C, we must have
I(A; f(B) | C) ≤ I(A;B | C). In (163) we used the fact that conditioning on an indepen-
dent random variable cannot reduce mutual information, i.e., I(A;B | C) ≤ I(A;B | C,D) if
I(A;D | C) = 0, and the fact that Z′1 is independent of W1 after conditioning on Wθ1,Qθ, θ by
construction of the scheme as described in Section 6. The last step is justified as follows. Because
of the conditioning on Z′1, its value is a constant for which there are only three possibilities: Z′1
is either the zero vector, or it is equal to µQθ for some non-zero µ ∈ Fq, or it is neither zero nor
equal to µQθ. If Z′1 is the zero vector, then the mutual information is automatically zero because
W1 is eliminated entirely. If Z′1 = µQθ for some non-zero µ, then W1Z′1 = µWθ1 and the mutual
information is again zero because of the conditioning on Wθ1. Finally, if Z′1 is neither zero nor a
scaled version of Qθ, then Z11Z′1 is a sum of uniformly random noise terms in Fq, at least one of
which is independent of Z11(θ) and Z′1. So in this case also the mutual information is zero. This
completes the proof of Corollary 3. 
B.3 Proof of Corollary 4
The proof of Corollary 4 is presented next. Recall that in the scheme of the proof of Theorem 4, the
user obtains the following three symbols from the answers,
WQθ = Wθ (165)
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WZ′ + ZZ′ (166)
WZ′ + ZBZ′ + ZBQθ. (167)
We show that symmetric security holds, i.e., conditioned on Z′, from these three symbols the user
learns nothing about the undesired messages W1, · · · ,Wθ−1,Wθ+1, · · · ,WK . When Z′ is the zero
vector, the symbol WZ′ is zero as well, leaking nothing about the undesired messages. Now
consider (166). If Z′ is not the zero vector, then the symbol WZ′ is protected by an independent
noise term. Similarly, consider (167) and consider three possibilities: B(Z′ +Qθ) is either zero,
or equal to Z′, or not zero and not equal to Z′. If B(Z′ + Qθ) is the zero vector, then because B
is invertible, we must have Z′ = Qθ, so the symbol WZ′ = WQθ is the desired message, again
leaking nothing about undesired messages. If B(Z′ +Qθ) = Z′ then (167) is redundant, i.e., same
as (166), so it leaks no new information. Finally, if B(Z′ + Qθ) is not zero and not equal to Z′,
then ZB(Z′ +Qθ) is independent of ZZ′, so that (167) is protected by an independent noise term.
Therefore, in all cases, the user learns nothing about undesired messages, and this completes the
proof of symmetric security. 
References
[1] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 4075–4088, July 2017.
[2] ——, “The Capacity of Robust Private Information Retrieval with Colluding Databases,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 2361–2370, April 2018.
[3] R. Tajeddine, O. W. Gnilke, D. Karpuk, R. Freij-Hollanti, C. Hollanti, and S. El Rouayheb,
“Private information retrieval schemes for codec data with arbitrary collusion patterns,” IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 1908–1912, 2017.
[4] Z. Jia, H. Sun, and S. Jafar, “The capacity of private information retrieval with disjoint collud-
ing sets,” in IEEE GLOBECOM, 2017.
[5] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval from Coded
Databases,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1945–1956, 2018.
[6] R. Freij-Hollanti, O. Gnilke, C. Hollanti, and D. Karpuk, “Private Information Retrieval from
Coded Databases with Colluding Servers,” SIAM Journal on Applied Algebra and Geometry,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 647–664, 2017.
[7] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “Private Information Retrieval from MDS Coded Data with Colluding
Servers: Settling a Conjecture by Freij-Hollanti et al.” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 1000–1022, February 2018.
[8] H.-Y. Lin, S. Kumar, E. Rosnes, and A. G. i Amat, “A capacity-achieving PIR protocol for
distributed storage using an arbitrary linear code,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.04923, 2018.
[9] R. T. Mohamed Adel Attia, Deepak Kumar, “The capacity of private information retrieval
from uncoded storage constrained databases,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.04104, 2018.
28
[10] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “Multi-message private information retrieval: Capacity results
and near-optimal schemes,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.01739, 2017.
[11] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “Optimal download cost of private information retrieval for arbitrary
message length,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 12, pp.
2920–2932, 2017.
[12] ——, “Multiround Private Information Retrieval: Capacity and Storage Overhead,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 5743–5754, August 2018.
[13] C. Tian, H. Sun, and J. Chen, “A Shannon-theoretic approach to the storage-retrieval tradeoff
in pir systems,” IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2018, pp. 1904–1908,
2018.
[14] S. Kadhe, B. Garcia, A. Heidarzadeh, S. E. Rouayheb, and A. Sprintson, “Private information
retrieval with side information,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.00112, 2017.
[15] Z. Chen, Z. Wang, and S. Jafar, “The capacity of private information retrieval with private
side information,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.03022, 2017.
[16] R. Tandon, “The capacity of cache aided private information retrieval,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1706.07035, 2017.
[17] Y.-P. Wei, K. Banawan, and S. Ulukus, “Fundamental limits of cache-aided private informa-
tion retrieval with unknown and uncoded prefetching,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.01056, 2017.
[18] ——, “The capacity of private information retrieval with partially known private side infor-
mation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.00809, 2017.
[19] S. P. Shariatpanahi, M. J. Siavoshani, and M. A. Maddah-Ali, “Multi-message private infor-
mation retrieval with private side information,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.11892, 2018.
[20] S. Li and M. Gastpar, “Single-server multi-message private information retrieval with side
information,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.05797, 2018.
[21] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “Private information retrieval through wiretap channel ii: Privacy
meets security,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.06171, 2018.
[22] Q. Wang, H. Sun, and M. Skoglund, “The capacity of private information retrieval with eaves-
droppers,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.10189, 2018.
[23] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “The capacity of private information retrieval from byzantine
and colluding databases,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.01442, 2017.
[24] Y. Zhang and G. Ge, “Private information retrieval from MDS coded databases with colluding
servers under several variant models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.03186, 2017.
[25] R. Tajeddine, O. W. Gnilke, D. Karpuk, R. Freij-Hollanti, and C. Hollanti, “Private information
retrieval from coded storage systems with colluding, byzantine, and unresponsive servers,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.08006, 2018.
29
[26] Q. Wang, H. Sun, and M. Skoglund, “The -error capacity of symmetric pir with byzantine
adversaries,” in 2018 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–5.
[27] X. Yao, N. Liu, and W. Kang, “The capacity of multi-round private information retrieval from
byzantine databases,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.06907, 2019.
[28] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “The capacity of symmetric private information retrieval,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, 2018.
[29] Q. Wang and M. Skoglund, “Linear symmetric private information retrieval for MDS coded
distributed storage with colluding servers,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.05673, 2017.
[30] ——, “Secure symmetric private information retrieval from colluding databases with adver-
saries,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.02152, 2017.
[31] H. Yang, W. Shin, and J. Lee, “Private information retrieval for secure distributed storage
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 2953–
2964, December 2018.
[32] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar, “Blind interference alignment for private information retrieval,” 2016
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 560–564, 2016.
[33] ——, “The capacity of private computation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.11098, 2017.
[34] M. Mirmohseni and M. A. Maddah-Ali, “Private function retrieval,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.04677, 2017.
30
